Simple Calculations to Reduce Litigation Costs in Personal Injury Cases: Additional Empirical Support for the Offset Rule by Carter, R. A. L. & Palmer, John P.
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 32, Number 2 (Summer 1994) Article 1
Simple Calculations to Reduce Litigation Costs in
Personal Injury Cases: Additional Empirical
Support for the Offset Rule
R. A. L. Carter
John P. Palmer
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Article
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall
Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Carter, R. A. L. and Palmer, John P.. "Simple Calculations to Reduce Litigation Costs in Personal Injury Cases: Additional Empirical
Support for the Offset Rule." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 32.2 (1994) : 197-223.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol32/iss2/1
Simple Calculations to Reduce Litigation Costs in Personal Injury Cases:
Additional Empirical Support for the Offset Rule
Abstract
This article demonstrates that if the nominal rate of interest equals the growth rate of nominal earnings, then a
strong case can be made for calculating lump-sum damage awards by using the offset rule, i.e., by simply
multiplying the annual loss by the number of years the loss is expected to continue. An examination of the
Canadian data not only supports the offset rule, but also suggests that plaintiffs are being systematically
undercompensated by rules currently in use.
This article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol32/iss2/1
SIMPLE CALCULATIONS TO REDUCE
LITIGATION COSTS IN PERSONAL
INJURY CASES: ADDITIONAL
EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR THE
OFFSET RULE0
By R.A.L. CARTER AND JOHN P. PALMER*
This article demonstrates that if the nominal rate of
interest equals the growth rate of nominal earnings,
then a strong case can be made for calculating lump-
sum damage awards by using the offset rule, i.e., by
simply multiplying the annual loss by the number of
years the loss is expected to continue. An examination
of the Canadian data not only supports the offset rule,
but also suggests that plaintiffs are being systematically
undercompesated by rules currently in use.
Cet article v6rifie l'hypoth~se selon laquelle on
applique le principe de compensation pour calculer les
dommages-int6rets A montant forfaiture lorsque le taux
d'int6ret nominal est 6quivalent au taux de croissance
des gains nominaux. La calculation se fait en
multipliant la perte annuelle par Ie num6ro d'ann6es
dont il est probable que la perte continuera. Outre 4
souligner Ie principe de compensation, l'analyse de
l'information canadienne sugg~re que les r~gles
actuellement en force ont 1effet syst6matique de priver
des demandeurs dune indemnit6 suffsante.
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The practice of awarding damages for personal injuries in lump sum form makes it
inappropriate for the courts to simply determine the plaintiff's annual loss and multiply it
by the number of years during which the loss will be suffered in order to determine the
amount of the award.
--Denise Reaume 1
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate two things: first, that
the assertion quoted above is wrong; and, second, that the current
practice in most Canadian jurisdictions (which is unfortunately based
upon the same flawed reasoning underlying the above quotation) is
systematically biased against plaintiffs in personal injury cases. To this
end, we posit a convincing a priori argument for ignoring interest and
inflation rates when determining damage awards and then support this
argument with Canadian data. Last, we argue that, even if individual
cases differ substantially from the average, decisions which ignore this
argument typically under-compensate plaintiffs.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past twenty-five years, Canadians have experienced
much wider fluctuations in interest and inflation rates than ever before.
As a result, the courts have had few precedents by which to calculate
damages for future losses. The courts knew that adequate allowance
had to be made for future higher prices, but they did not know how
much prices would rise. They also knew that interest rates were
changing with expectations about inflation, but they were not sure what
interest rate to use in calculating lump-sum awards.
Because of these confusions and uncertainties, lengthy testimony
was heard about the appropriate numbers to use in damages
1 Ontario Law Reform Commission: Project for Personal Injury and Death, Compensation for
the Loss of Working Capacity (Toronto, January 1987) [unpublished] at 100.
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calculations. In some exceptional instances, the numbers finally
accepted seem reasonable with the benefit of hindsight; in others, they
seem egregiously unfair.
For over a century, damages awards have taken into
consideration that a lump-sum award could be re-invested to earn future
income? Only comparatively recently, however, have the courts taken
account of the effect of inflation on both the expected future income and
on nominal (or stated) interest rates? In these first few attempts to
account for inflation, the courts appear to have committed some serious
blunders.
In Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd.,4 the Court heard
testimony about the real rate of interest (defined as the stated or
nominal rate of interest minus the expected rate of inflation) and settled
on a rate of 7 per cent.5 After some time, however, the courts began to
hear increasing testimony from expert witnesses that the Andrews
decision relied on an expected rate of inflation that was too low and,
consequently, a forecasted real rate of interest that was much too high.
As a result, the courts began accepting much lower real rates of interest
by which to discount the awards. 6
During the late 1970s and 1980s, people's expectations changed
rapidly to the point of seeming capricious. Actual rates of inflation
skyrocketed in comparison with previous North American experiences,
and real economic growth rates were highly variable. The courts no
longer had firm notions about what to expect for the future and, hence,
were at a loss as to the appropriate rate by which to discount plaintiffs'
damages awards. The result was that plaintiffs and defendants alike
called on copious expert testimony about likely future interest and
inflation rates.7
The expert testimony on expected interest and inflation rates
appears to have had two major results: (1) many people came to accept
2 For an excellent summary of the cases and the historical development of the issues, see the
unpublished research reports for the Ontario Law Reform Commission: Project for Personal Injury
and Death (Toronto, January 1987). In particular, see D. Reaume, supra note 1; SA. Rea, Jr., An
Economic Perspective; and G. Bale, Cost of Future Care Periodic Payments, Structured Settlements,
Discounting Taxation, and Gross-up.
3 See inh& note 4.
4 [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229 [hereinafterAndrews].
5 Ibid. at 259.
6 See, for example, Fenn v. City of Peterborough (1979), 25 O.R. (2d) 399. See also Bale, supra
note 2 at 103; and Reaume, supra note 1 at 104-05.
7 See Mandzuk v. Vieira (1986), 2 B.C. L.R. (2d) 344 (CA), especially at 363.
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that, in the long run, the real rate of interest would probably be near 2.5
per cent; and (2) in an attempt to reduce litigation costs, many provinces
created rules establishing a real rate of interest of 2.5 per cent.8
Our results show that while 2.5 per cent may or may not be an
appropriate estimate of the real rate of interest, it is inappropriate to
discount plaintiffs' awards by 2.5per cent as a first step.
The empirical evidence we present in the following sections is
consistent with adopting what has come to be known as the offset rule.9
According to the offset rule, one calculates an appropriate lump-sum
award simply by multiplying the amount to be awarded for the first year
by the number of years for which the loss is expected to continue (the
rate of growth of nominal labour income is offset by the nominal interest
rate). At present, no jurisdiction in Canada uses this rule. The key to
our results is that we incorporate additional information about the
likelihood that labour productivity will increase-information which is
not incorporated into provincial rules that specify the real interest rate
to be used for damage awards.
Virtually every writer on the subject of damages awards has
recognized that an individual is likely to have increasing earnings over
his or her lifetime. These increases generally come from wage inflation
and from real increases in labour productivity; but because increases in
labour productivity seem to have been perceived as uncertain or more
personalized, these increases have frequently been understated, and they
have certainly been ignored in the general rules that have been
formulated.
Recognition of the importance of overall, economy-wide
increases in labour productivity has been slow, but people have finally
begun to recognize that even if labour productivity fails to grow in one
particular occupation or industry, competition and mobility in labour
8 Initially, the stated policy in British Columbia was that the courts should use the investment
rate of interest minus the expected rate of inflation. Unfortunately, this type of rule provided little
assistance to the courts: it did not specify which investment rate should be used, nor did it specify
how the expected rate of inflation was to be determined. To solve these issues, the current rate is
set at 2.5 per cent in that province. Ontario (Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 53.09) set the real rate at
2.5 per cent, as did Nova Scotia (Civil Procedure Rules, r. 31.10). At about the same time, courts in
Australia began using a real discount rate of 3 per cent. See Bale, supra note 2 at 104-20.
9 See M.T. Brody, "Inflation, Productivity, and the Total Offset Method of Calculating
Damages for Lost Future Earnings" (1982) 49 U. Chicago L Rev. 1002. For a clear discussion of
this rule, see R. Posner, EconomicAnalysis ofLaw, 4th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1992) at 194-95.
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markets tend, over several years, to force wages up throughout the
economy to reflect the economy-wide labour productivity changes.1 0
In this study, we find that, in general, one cannot reject the
hypothesis that the offset rule is appropriate, i.e., that nominal earnings
grow over time, on average, by a rate equal to the nominal rate of
interest. Given these results, it is appropriate to adopt the offset rule as
a starting point for damage awards.
Current standard practice is for the courts to personalize an
award, including a possible allowance for increased labour productivity
that is generally less than 2.5 per cent and then to discount the award by
the prescribed rate of 2.5 per cent. While this procedure has the
beneficial effect of reducing litigation costs considerably (vis-dt-vis taking
testimony about expected inflation and interest rates), it has the
drawback that it does not go far enough. Our results imply that this
procedure systematically under-compensates plaintiffs,11 especially those
who are expected to suffer a loss over a long period of time. The results
also point to a possible additional savings in litigation costs.
In the next section, we present an example of how the offset rule
would work. In the subsequent section (and in the Appendix), we review
some of the criticisms of this apparently naive rule. In succeeding
sections, we present the results of empirical tests of the argument's
underlying assumptions; and in the final section, we conclude that,
although the rule may be inappropriate if the period of loss is expected
to be short, the assumptions on which it is based are fundamentally
sound and should provide better guidance for the courts than does the
current practice.
10 See Reaume, supra note 1 at 50: "If these general trends are not taken into account it is
likely that the injured plaintiff will end up with a lower standard of living than she would have been
able to afford if she had gone on working." See also the Report to the Committee of the Supreme
Court of Ontario on Fixing Capitalization Rates in Damage Actions (Toronto, 14 February 1980) at
8: "Other factors which could bear on the ultimate award would have to be dealt with by agreement
of the parties or by the adducing of evidence thereon. They would include: ... (2) the probability of
increased productivity of the income-producer in question."
11 There is no a priori reason that this procedure should systematically under-compensate
plaintiffs. Instead, we base this assertion on the fact that so many cases rely on the testimony of
actuaries and others who assume that increases in labour productivity will average 1 or 2 per cent
per year. The result is that the award is discounted by somewhere between .5 per cent and 2 per
cent, when, in general, the awards should not be discounted at all.
1994]
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II. DISCOUNTING: A SIMPLE APPROACH
There are, among other things, two reasons why a plaintiffs
annual losses will grow over time: productivity growth and inflation. For
example, a $1,000 earnings differential this year would become
approximately a $5,427 annual differential in twenty-five years if both
earnings (i.e., those that would have been earned before the incident
that gave rise to the suit and those that will be earned after the incident)
used to calculate this differential grew at the same rate of, for example, 7
per cent each year. How much of this 7 per cent growth is due to
inflation and how much is due to productivity growth does not really
matter for this example. We would compensate the plaintiff now for the
$5,427 loss twenty-five years from now if we award $1,000 today, and if
that amount could be invested at 7 per cent, it would grow to become
precisely $5,427 after twenty-five years. After twenty-three years, the
amount would be $4,741; after fifteen years, $2,759; after fourteen years,
$2,579, et cetera. In other words, we would award the plaintiff $1,000
today for each year of loss, and the plaintiff could invest it at current
interest rates, each year withdrawing an amount equal to what the loss
would be in that year.
Regardless of what the amount is in each year, it is important to
recognize that if the plaintiff has the opportunity to save at a nominal
interest rate equal to the expected rate of growth in the nominal
earnings differential, then a current award of $1,000 for each year of
future expected loss is appropriate. Given the goal of compensating the
plaintiff for lost earnings in each of those years, we should like to make
an award today that will allow the plaintiff to receive precisely those
amounts in each future year, and for a constant (current dollar) expected
loss of $1,000 per year for twenty-five years this amount totals $25,000.12
III. REFINEMENTS OF THE BASIC MODEL
The procedure set out in part II has come to be known as "the
total offset rule" because of the hypothesis that the various expected
inflation, growth, and interest rates all cancel each other out, yielding a
simple formula for the award: just multiplying the amount of the loss by
the number of years. This formula was used by the Alaska courts in
12 The mathematics of the offset rule and its variations are presented in section A of the
Appendix.
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Beaulieu v. Elliott.13 It was later modified by the rule in State v. Guinn14
which stated, correctly, that age-earnings profiles should also be taken
into consideration in cases involving lost personal earnings.
Refinements to the offset rule are presented in the Appendix, showing
that it is possible to take account of specific deviations from the offset
rule not only because of these life-cycle variations in productivity, but
also because of variations in interest rates over time, differences in life
expectancies, and differences in the likelihood of being employed. The
derivations presented there show that while it may be important to
personalize an award, it is at least as important that the courts begin with
the proper base for the award; and the data confirm that, for awards
involving more than a few years, the offset rule provides this base.
IV. THE ECONOMIC MODEL AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The basis of the total offset rule and the hypothesis of interest is
that for any month the ratio of the nominal rate of growth in labour
income, divided by the nominal interest rate, is just as often above one as
it is below one,1 5 ie., it is hypothesized that the median of (the nominal
growth rate in labour income)/(the nominal interest rate) = 1.
Since we typically have no clear expectation about the future
rates of productivity growth in individual occupations or industries (i.e.,
the present and post-event occupations or industries), we take as a
starting point the assumption that future productivity growth in all
occupations will equal that for the economy as a whole. Some evidence
in support of this assumption is provided by Anderson and Roberts. 16
Clear evidence to the contrary would, of course, induce us to alter this
assumption for individual cases. Similarly, we assume that the same
13 434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1967) [hereinafter Beaulieu].
14 555 P.2d 530 (Alaska 1976) [hereinafter Guinn].
1 5 Because the hypotheses will be formed about the multiplicative relationship, it is convenient
for us to test the hypotheses in logarithmic form. Consequently, when we conduct tests concerning
a lognormal distribution, we are making direct inferences about the median of the original form of
the data. In appendices to our more technical papers on this subject ("Real Rates, Expected Rates,
and Damage Awards" University of Western Ontario, 1991 [unpublished]; and "Real Rates,
Expected Rates, and Damage Awards," (1991) 29 J. Legal Stud. 439, we show how inferences about
the median of the logarithmic form lead to inferences about the mean of the original form of the
data.
16 G.A. Anderson & D.L. Roberts, "Stability in the Present Value Determination of Future
Lost Earnings: An Historical Perspective with Implications for Predictability" (1985) 39 U. Miami
L Rev. 847.
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expected future rates of inflation are relevant to plaintiffs in all
occupations.
Of course, the presence of random components in both
unobservable expectations and observed data means that schemes such
as the offset rule, the Ontario rule (that the real discount rate be 2.5 per
cent), and their variants can be expected to hold as base periods only on
average over all possible examples, and all possible time spans. Thus,
such schemes can be expected, at best, to yield the correct award, only on
average.
For example, nominal growth rates of earnings and nominal
interest rates depend on the date at which the loss occurs. If we imagine
various time periods over history with different starting dates, we would
find that, for some, the ratio of these two rates would exceed one, while
for others, it would be less than one.17
Our hypothesis, that the median of the ratio of nominal labour
income growth to nominal interest rates equals one, is equivalent to the
hypothesis that the mean of the logarithm of the ratio equals zero, which
is the hypothesis we tested.18 For this study, we used average weekly
labour earnings, which are reported monthly in Employment Earnings
and Hours,19 to calculate the growth rate of labour income. To measure
the nominal rate of interest, we used monthly observations on federal
government ten-year bonds. We then adjusted the interest-rate data to
calculate monthly holding period rates of return on those long-term
securities.2 0
1 7 This point is the gist of the criticism of the offset rule by CJ. Lacroix & H.L. Miller, Jr.,
"Lost Earnings Calculations and Tort Law: Reflections on the Pfeifer Decision" (1986) 8 U. Hawaii
L Rev. 31. Lacroix and Miller maintain, at 52, that "this relationship [ie., the hypothesis that we
are testing] has not been empirically verified and may hold, if it does, only over very long periods of
time." For a thorough discussion of the problems associated with uncritical applications of the
offset rule, see M. Vellrath, "Discounting, Growth, and Interest Rates" (Paper presented at the
conference, Damages: Strategies and Calculations, of the Continuing Legal Education Satellite
Network series (Ernst and Young), 1989) [unpublished].
18 Details of some earlier test results are available in Carter & Palmer, supra note 15. The
tests rely on the additional assumption that expectations are formed rationally, i.e., without any
systematic error. See J.F. Muth, "Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements"
(1961) 29 Econometrica 315.
19 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, Labour Division, December 1947 -November 1985).
2 0 See RJ. Shiller, "The Volatility of Long-Term Interest Rates and Expectations Models of
the Term Structure" (1979) 87 J. Pol. Econ. 1190 [hereinafter "Volatility"]; and section C of the
Appendix.
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We were unable to reject the hypothesis that the mean of the log
of the ratio is equal to zero 2 Graphs of the various calculations
presented in Figures 1 and 2 show both the short-run variability of the
ratio and its lack of a long-term trend. The only difference between the
two graphs is that the graph in Figure 2 uses seasonally adjusted data to
remove some of the seasonal spikes in the data which occurred regularly
each year.
There are also two horizontal lines plotted along the graphs in
Figures 1 and 2. The line of short dashes extending from a value of zero
shows the assumptions of the offset rules. The second line, of long
dashes, shows the effect of using the Ontario rule of discounting 2.5 per
cent, but allowing for no growth in labour productivity. Notice that this
rule is at great variance with the data. If the current practice of allowing
for some growth in labour productivity and using a net discount rate of
only 1.5 per cent were used, the long dashed line would be much closer
to the observed data, but would still, on average, lie below them.
It is also noticeable that the ratio has much greater variability
during periods of greater uncertainty about inflation rates. These results
confirm that the assumptions underlying the offset rule are plausible
when it is to be used for losses which will continue for a long period of
time. It appears that the assumptions may also hold for short-term
losses, though with much less certainty.22
21 If anything, the data suggest that the growth of nominal labour earnings in Canada has been
greater than that of the nominal rate of interest. In this case, if the provincial rules specifying a
discount rate of 2.5 per cent are adhered to, then the courts should, on average, be allowing
prospective increases in labour earnings of even more that 2.5 per cent per year! Using the time
period from the end of 1947 until the end of 1985, we had 456 observations of monthly growth in
labour income and monthly holding-period rates of return on ten-year government bonds.
Unfortunately, the data series on labour income ends in 1986, so we were unable to extend our
analysis to more recent years. The average of the difference of the logarithms over these 456
observations is .00139, suggesting that, if anything, labour incomes grew at a rate slightly higher than
the nominal interest rate. Taking account of the stationary autocorrelated nature of the series, the
standard error is .00108, and the t-statistic is 1.418. These numbers say that we cannot, with any
confidence, reject the hypothesis that the two rates are the same. In other words, these statistical
tests support what the graphs in Figures 1 and 2 tell us; namely, that the evidence does not
contradict. the implications of the offset rule. The series plotted in Figures 1 and 2 are d, from
equation 22 in the Appendix.
22 If we subdivide the sample into two time periods, this result becomes clearer. Because the
data appear to have been stable from 1947 until 1979, we applied our tests first to that time period
and then to the remainder of the data. From the end of 1947 though to the end of 1979, the mean
of the differences of the logarithms was .00242, with a standard error, correcting for stationary
autocorrection, of .000746 and a resulting t-statistic of 3.24. These results suggest that over that
time period, if anything, even the offset rule would have under-compensated plaintiffs because
average labour incomes grew at a slightly higher rate than the rate of interest. But for the 72
observations from the end of 1979 through the end of 1985, the mean was -.00410, with a standard
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V. COMPARISON OF AWARD RULES
It is apparent from the data in Figures I and 2 that the offset rule
does a better job of matching awards with actual losses than either a 2.5
per cent rule or even a 1.5 per cent rule. The superiority of the offset
rule becomes even clearer in Figures 3 to 6, which show how the
different compensation rules would compare with a prescient court.
If a prescient court had been able to make awards precisely
based on the actual growth in nominal labour income and the actual
nominal interest rate, then the typical plaintiff would, on average, have
received exactly 100 per cent of their losses, no more and no less, as
indicated by the lines at 100 per cent in each of the figures. The
remaining lines plotted in Figures 3 to 6 show the percentage of the ex
post correct award that plaintiffs would have received had courts not had
this perfect foresight, but instead used one of the alternative rules. The
problem we address arises because courts do not have perfect foresight
and must, therefore, devise criteria and rules for calculating damage
awards.
In Figure 3, we consider a series of twenty-year awards,
beginning in 1948. For each month, we calculated and plotted the
percentage of the perfect-foresight awards that a plaintiff would have
received had the offset rule been used to calculate the award for a
twenty-year loss. This percentage is shown as a line lying just below the
perfect-foresight line at 100 per cent. While the offset rule line is very
close to the 100 per cent line, it remains below it, indicating that for
twenty-year awards, the offset rule would consistently have under-
compensated plaintiffs.
Two other lines in Figure 3 show the percentage of the perfect-
foresight awards that plaintiffs would have received under the 1.5 per
cent rule and under the 2.5 per cent rule. For twenty-year losses, the 2.5
per cent rule would have under-compensated plaintiffs so severely in
each year that the compounded effect would have been to award them
generally less than 80 per cent of what they would have received from a
prescient court! Even the 1.5 per cent rule would have awarded them
only approximately 91 per cent of the perfect-foresight award. In
comparison, the offset rule would have under-compensated them by no
more than I per cent.
error, correcting for stationary autocorrelation, of .00534 and a corresponding t-statistic of -.769. So
once again, using data for this short, turbulent time, we are unable to reject the basic assumptions of
the offset rule. Even though these results inspire less confidence in applying the offset rule for the
short-term awards than for long-term awards, we wish to emphasize that the offset rule is, on
average, still likely to be a better starting point than other rules, even in these instances.
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Figures 4 through 6 show the same comparison for fifteen-, ten-,
and five-year awards. For shorter time periods, the percentage of
undercompensation from the 2.5 per cent rule and the 1.5 per cent rule
is less than that shown in Figure 3 because the undercompensation is
compounded over fewer years. Nevertheless, in all four Figures, it is
clear that the offset rule comes closer to the perfect-foresight award than
either alternative rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
Upon careful examination of the available evidence, we cannot
find any significant difference between the nominal rate of interest and
the growth rate of nominal labour income over spans of up to 38 years in
Canada. These results are consistent with the results of our earlier
study.3
Suppose that, for some reason, it would be easy to establish that
a plaintiff's loss in a law suit would be $1,000 this year, and that this loss
was going to recur for the next twenty-five years. Then our results
present compelling evidence that it is appropriate to award the plaintiff
$25,000 as a judgment. Forget about discounting future amounts
according to a given interest rate; forget about correcting for the
expected rate of inflation; and forget about allowing for overall
productivity growth in the economy. The simple solution is just as likely
to be correct as any other more complex solution. It is sure to reduce
the costs of litigation, and it is clearly a better starting place than that of
current practice (which uses net discount rates of between 1 and 2.5 per
cent), even if the facts of an individual case deviate from overall
averages.
The importance of this result is that it confirms earlier
suggestions that there is, on average, no need to try to estimate nominal
or real interest rates, inflation rates, or the aggregate growth of labour
productivity in cases involving a loss of earning capacity over time: these
terms all cancel out in the equation for calculating the present value of
the stream of losses (with the proviso that tax effects are taken into
account). This result should contribute toward dramatically reducing
legal costs to both plaintiffs and defendants who, until now, have been
devoting scarce resources to expert testimony on the correct values of
these variables.
23 See R.A.L. Carter & J.D. Palmer, "Real Rates, Expected Rates, and Damage Awards"
(1991) 29 J. Legal Stud. 439.
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Even in cases for which the total offset rule is not acceptable, the
result will be of some benefit to plaintiffs if, as is the practice in many
jurisdictions, the courts implicity rely on assumptions that the nominal
rate of interest is larger than the expected growth rate of nominal labour
income. The evidence we present here quite clearly shows that, on
average, the growth rate of labour income has, if anything, exceeded the
nominal interest rate.
Because of the comparative instability of the data from the late
1970s onward, a reasonable question to be asked is whether we expect
the assumptions of the offset rule to apply as well in the future as they
have in the past. We are not soothsayers. We cannot predict whether
changing underlying circumstances will affect these results. We can,
however, say with a high degree of confidence that if the underlying
conditions do not change, or if they revert to being more like those for
the period between 1947 and 1979, then using the offset rule in Canada
will, on average, correctly compensate plaintiffs and will reduce litigation
costs for both parties. The margin for error may be larger for shorter
time periods, but, on average, the offset rule provides a better starting
point than the rules currently in use.
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Support for the Offset Rule
APPENDIX
This appendix discusses some of the technical aspects of the
methods used to obtain the results presented in the body of the paper.
Some of these points are presented more fully in our earlier papers.2 4
A. Sufficient Conditions For the Applicability of the Offset Rule
Assume that in period 0 the plaintiff suffered a loss of $D0 which
is expected to persist for Nyears. The attractiveness of the offset rule is
the simplicity of its formula for setting the size of the award, AN, the
plaintiff should receive as compensation. In this section, we set out the
sufficient conditions for the accuracy of this simple formula, based on
increasingly realistic assumptions about rates of interest and inflation,
life cycle effects, and life expectancies. The body of the paper considers
whether Canadian data provide convincing evidence to contradict these
conditions.
We begin by assuming that the plaintiff is certain to survive for N
years, that rates of interest, growth, and inflation are constant, and that
there are no life cycle effects. We want to find the present discounted
value of Do for a year T years in the future, where T < N. Let g be the
real rate of interest, p be the expected rate of labour productivity growth,
i be the rate of price inflation, and w be the rate of wage inflation that
the plaintiff is expected to experience for each of T years in the future.
Then the sum we seek is composed of annual amounts given by
(1) PV=Do (1 + W)T(l +P)T
(1 + i)r(l + g)
T
In this simple case, the total award, AN, which will exactly compensate
the plaintiff for his or her loss is the sum of the values given by (1) over
the N years for which the loss will persist.
2 4 Supra note 15.
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N
(2) AN= 7, PVT
T=1
N (1+w)T(1+p)T
T=1 (1+i)T(1+g)
T
A sufficient condition for this to reduce to
(3) A,=Nx D o
as given by the offset rule, is
(4) (l+w) T (l+p)T =(1+i)T (l+g)T
Of course, it is not necessary to have w = i andp = g.
We introduce more realism by allowing w,p, i, and g to vary over
the t years between year 0 and year T, which gives
(1+w1 )(1+p )(1+w 2)(1+p 2 ) ... (l+'w)(l+pr)
T (l+w,)(l+p,)
=Doll (l +it)(l+gt)
t-I
Now the award that will correctly compensate the plaintiff for his or her
loss is
N
(6) AN= 7, PVT
T=1
N I (1+w,)(1+p1 )
=DoY'YI (l+it)(l+gt)
T=1 t=1
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A sufficient condition for this to reduce to (3) is
( (l+Wt)(l+pt)
(7) IH (1+i)(1+g) =1;T=,...,N
Note that this is weaker than the previous condition (4) in that it allows
the wt, Pt, it, and gt to all be different from one another. A stronger
condition than (7) is
(8) (1+w,)(1+pt)=(1+it)(1+gt); t-1, ... , T
which is sufficient for (7) and, hence, for (3).
We now introduce life cycle effects, 1(t), which we represent as
functions of time which multiply the labour productivity term to give
T (l+wt)(l+pt)l(t)
(9) PV7r=DolI (l+it)(l+g,)
t-I
Now, if (8) holds, we have
N N T
(10) AN= I PVT=Do I 1-Il(t)
T=1 T=1 t=1
which would reduce to (3) if ITt=l 1(t)=1, which seems credible.
Alternatively, if
T (1+W w)(1 +p,)(t)(11t) 1 =1; T=1, ... ,N
t=l 1i)(~t
then (3) would hold. Note that (11) allows the wt, Pt, 1(t), i, and gt to all
be different from one another.
Next we let the probability that the plaintiff will be alive in year t
bex(t). Now,
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T (1 +W)(1 +p)l(t)x(t)
(12) PVT=D0 I-
t=l t(1 t
and
N T (l+wt)(l+pt)l(t)x(t)
(13) A=DO, H (l+i)(l+g)
T=1 t:=1
If (8) holds, (13) reduces to
N T
(14) AN=Do X H l(t)x(t)
T=I t=1
which becomes (3) if H17=j l(t)x(t)=1. Alternatively, a sufficient
condition for (13) to reduce to (3) is
S(1+w,)(1+pt)l(t)x(t)(15) H = .(1) r (1+i,)(1+gt) =t-I
Note that (15) allows the wt, pt, 1(t), x(t), it, and gt to all be different from
one another.
B. The Economic Motivation For Differences of Logs
If we take the log of both sides of equation (5), we obtain
(16) log(PV)=
Tlog(D0)+ [log(1+ w,) +log(1 +p ,)- log(1 +g ,)-log( 1+ i1)].
t=l
[VOL 32 No. 2218
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The variables wt, pt, it, and gt, which appear in (16), and the equations of
the previous section are all ex ante rates, Le., they are expectations about
the future values of rates which are not directly observable. Their expost
realized values will be denoted by epw,, eppt, epi and epgt, respectively.
Let eprt be the ex post nominal rate of interest. Then the Fisher2s
equation
(17) log(1 + r) = log(1 + i) + log(1 + g,)
can be extended to relate eprt to epit and epgt by
(18) log(1 +eprt) =log(1 + epi,)+log(1 +epg,)
Let rt be the ex ante nominal rate of interest, which is related to the ex
post rate by
(19) log(1 + epr,) = [log(1 + eprt)- log(l+ r)] + log(1 + i,) + log(1 + g,)
= ut+ log(1 + it) + log(1 + gt)
where ut = log(1 + eprt) - log(1 + rt) is a forecast error which shows the
extent to which expectations, formed at time 0, about log(l+rt), turn out
to be wrong. If expectation like it and gt are formed rationally, then
forecast errors like ut are random variables with zero means which are
uncorrelated with anything in the set of information used in making the
forecasts.
An equation analogous to (18) is assumed to link the ex post
nominal rate of growth of labour income, epft, to epwt and eppt
(20) log(1 + epf,) = log(1 + epw,) + log(1 + epp) .
Let ft be the ex ante nominal rate of labour income growth. Then an
equation analogous to (19) relates it to the expost rate.
2 5 See I. Fisher, "Appreciation and Interest" (1896) 2 Publications of the American Economic
Association (3d) 341.
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(21) log(l+epft)= [log(l+epft)-log(l+ft)]+log(l+wt)+log(l+pt)
=v,+log(l+wt)+log(l+pt).
The forecast error vt has the same properties as ut if expectations about
rates of growth of nominal income are formed rationally.
Using equations (19) and (21) we form the difference
(22) dt = log(1 + epf)- log(1 + epr,)
= [log(l+ w)+log(l +p)log(l+ it)-log(l+g )]+ v
- 
u,.
If equation (8) holds, equation (22) reduces to dt = vt - ut. Since both
epft and eprt are ex post observable quantities, we are able to examine
data to see whether d, grows over time or behaves like a series with a
constant- mean.
C. Holding Period Rates of Return
The interest rate used in all our calculations is the holding period
rate of return on government bonds with maturities of ten years or more.
This section explains how these rates were calculated.
Consider a bond which will mature in m years and which carries
coupons payable each year. If this bond is held for only one year-a
linear approximation to the one year-the expost holding period rate of
return at year t is given by Shiller26 and Shiller et al.27 as:
(23) ephtm= epbt,,m+ (dur,- 1)(epbtm- epbt+l.,i)
where epbt, ra is the expost nominal rate of interest at time t on a bond of
maturity m years; epb+lm.1 is the expost rate at time t + 1 on a bond of
maturity m - 1; and durm is the duration of a bond of maturity m given by
durm = (1-hm)/(1-h) and h = 1/(1+ rbar) with rbar the rate at which the
coupon payment is discounted over one year. Of course, durm will be
26 See "Volatility," supra note 20; and "Alternative Tests of Rational Expectations Models"
(1981) 16 J. Econometrics 71.
27 R.J. Shiller, J.Y. Campbell & K.L. Schoenholtz, "Forward Rates and Future Policy:
Interpreting the Term Structure of Interest Rates" (1983) 1 Brookings Pap. Econ. Act. 173.
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less than m for any bond carrying coupons. Equation (23) says that
epht, m is the ex post rate of interest plus the capital gain obtained by
selling the bond after holding it for one year. Since the capital gain
could be negative for some period, we could have negative values for
ephtm.
Our first step in computing ephtm was to specify epbt,m as the rate
of interest on government bonds with maturities of ten years or longer.2 8
Our second step was, following Shiller et al.,29 to set rbar equal to the
sample average for epbt,,m. As we did not have data on the rate of
interest paid on bonds with maturities of nine years, we approximated
epbt+,m- with epbt+i,m. Equation (23) was then evaluated to obtain 456
values of the (approximate) monthly holding period rate of return from
December 1947 to November 1985. The series epht was then substituted
for eprt in equation (22).
D. Testing the Stationarity of dt
Perhaps the most important question to ask about the series dt
defined in (22) is whether it grows over time, i.e., whether it is non-
stationary or stationary. Box and Jenkins30 advocated inspecting the
sample autocorrelations to decide this question. Dickey, Hasza, and
Fuller31 recommended a more formal procedure for detecting stochastic
trends caused by unit roots in the autoregressive polynomial of the
series. We used a new procedure by Kwaitkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and
Shin32 which has two advantages over the earlier methods. First, it takes
stationarity as the null hypothesis rather than as the alternative. Second,
it is robust to the form of the Auto-Regressive Moving Average (ARmA)
process driving dt under the null, ie., one need not assume the length of
the regular and seasonal autoregressive structures. However, it does
2 8 This series is published monthly (thus, m = 120 in equation (23)) in the Bank of Canada
Review (Ottawa: Bank of Canada, December 1947 - November 1985) and is available from the
cA~sim database with the data bank number B14013.
29 Supra note 27.
3 0 G.E.P. Box & G.M. Jenkins, Tine Series Analysis: Forecasting and Control (San Francisco:
Holden-Day, 1976) at c. 2.
31 D.A! Dickey, D.P. Hasza & WA. Fuller, "Testing for Unit Roots in Seasonal Times Series"
(1984) 79 J. Am. Stat. A. 355.
32 D. Kwaitkowski et aL, "Testing the Null Hypothesis of Stationarity Against the Alternative
of a Unit Root: How Sure Are We That Economic Times Series Have a Unit Root?" (1992) 54 J.
Econometrics 159.
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require the specification of a lag length for calculation of the long-run
variance.
We applied the test to the deviations of dt about their sample
average. The asymptotic right tail 10 per cent critical value is .347 and
the 5 per cent value is .463. We computed values of the test statistic for
several values of the lag length using both the values of dt computed
from the raw data and the values computed from the seasonally adjusted
data. The results are shown in the table below.
TABLE 1
Values of Test Statistics
Lag Length Raw Data Seasonally Adjusted
4 .291 .266
12 .258 .217
20 .238 .205
24 .238 .203
36 .228 .195
The lag of 4 was the same as that used to calculate the standard error of
the mean in the next section. The lags of 12, 24, and 36 were chosen
with the seasonal nature of the data in mind. The lag of 20 is slightly less
than the square root of the sample size. None of the values of the test
statistic are large enough to cause us to reject the null hypothesis of
stationarity, Le., we conclude that the dt series is free from both
stochastic and deterministic trends. This conclusion justifies the
calculations of the next section.
E. The Standard Error of the Mean
One of our aims in this paper is to estimate the mean, over time,
of dt. A natural point estimator is the average of the sample points
which are plotted in Figure 1. Of course, a point estimate must be
accompanied by a measure of precision, the standard error. If the
sample observations were independent, the standard error would be
simply the sample standard deviation divided by the square root of the
[VOL 32 NO. 2222
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number of observations. However, our sample is a time series whose
observations are clearly not independent.
One way to proceed would have been to build a seasonal ARMA
model of the series using the techniques of Box and Jenkins33 and use its
parameter estimates to obtain both an estimate of the mean and its
standard error. There are two disadvantages to this procedure. First, a
single AEMA model could not be expected to fit the whole of the samples
because of the obvious change in structure at the end of 1979. Second,
the estimate of the standard error of the mean derived from the
estimated parameters of an ARMA model would be sensitive to the
structure of the model used. The choice of this structure, often referred
to as the "identification" of the model, is notorious for being the most
difficult aspect of time series analysis and for failing to provide unique
answers.
For these reasons, we chose to use an estimate of the standard
error which requires only that the process generating the data be
stationary but which uses no information about the structure of the
ARMA process that generated the data. Although the series dt appears to
be stationary, it contains a large seasonal component, so we first de-
seasonalized it by the standard ratio-to-moving-average method. This
left the sample average virtually unchanged. The standard error of the
samples mean was the square root of34
(24) (Se(a)) 2= Y. -Xi)[I -(,,+) I
i=0
where y (i) is the estimated autocovariance at lag i and m is the integer
part of T. 4 , which is 4 for 322 < T < 526.
33 See supra note 30 at c. 9.
34 See P.C.B. Phillips, "Times Series Regressions with a Unit Root" (1987) 55 Econometrica
277 at 286.
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